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Abstract
Progressive taxation is an effective redistributive tool in times of growing in-
equality. However, like all public policies, an increase in tax progressivity is unlikely
if it lacks popular demand. Has the financial crisis affected the demand for progres-
sive taxation? Building on research that has identified fairness beliefs as the main
factor pushing for taxes on the rich, I argue that the Great Recession and states’ re-
actions to it have caused a general shift in tax policy preferences. As a consequence,
demand for tax progressivity is higher in crisis countries. Multilevel analyses using
survey data for 32 countries show support for my argument. These findings have
important implications for our understanding of the politics of redistribution in the
21st century.
Keywords: taxation, inequality, redistribution, preferences, fairness
∗I wish to thank Jonas Driedger, Joseph Ganderson, Philipp Genschel, Ellen Halliday, Mar-
tin Höpner, Katy Morris, Kenneth Scheve, Laura Seelkopf, Martin Weinrich, Paula Zuluaga,
workshop participants at the European University Institute and Ringberg Castle, as well as
the Editor of the Journal of Public Policy and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable
comments and suggestions. Data Availability Statement: Replication materials are available in
the Journal of Public Policy Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WKCZ9Z
†European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Via dei Roc-
cettini 9, I-50014, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), email: julian.limberg@eui.eu
1 Introduction
In recent decades, inequality has increased massively in most countries around the world
(Atkinson & Piketty 2010). Some authors even consider growing inequality as a funda-
mental threat to democracy (Piketty 2014). Progressive taxation is a highly effective tool
to reduce inequality. Yet, popular demand is an essential prerequisite for an increase in
tax progressivity. But when do people demand tax progressivity? Several scholars have
argued that fairness arguments have a strong impact on people’s political appetite for
progressive taxation (Alesina & Angeletos 2005; Ballard-Rosa, Martin, & Scheve 2017;
Durante, Putterman, & van der Weele 2014; Tyran & Sausgruber 2006). If the economic
success of rich people is perceived as ‘undeserved’, demand for tax progressivity increases.
Mass mobilization for war has historically been the main cause of fairness-based prefer-
ence shifts in favour of progressive taxation (Scheve & Stasavage 2016). However, after an
initial period of very high tax rates on the rich in the post-war era, tax progressivity has
decreased remarkably in the last forty years (Kiser & Karceski 2017). There are multiple
explanations for this, covering tax competition (Ganghof 2006; Genschel, Kemmerling,
& Seils 2011; Genschel & Schwarz 2011; Swank 2006) and the disappearance of mass
warfare (Obinger 2012; Scheve & Stasavage 2012). So, can fairness arguments still play
a role for taxing the rich in the 21st century?
This article looks at tax policy preferences in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008
in order to answer this question. I argue that fairness arguments have increased demand
for progressive taxation in countries that faced a deep recession. Two factors account
for this. First, the crisis has put a spotlight on risky investment behaviour on financial
markets. Thus, perceptions of rich people’s wealth as individually deserved – hence, as
based on their hard work and merit – have suffered. Second, the role of the state before
and during the crisis has raised concerns about institutional deservingness. Crucially, the
crisis has increased the salience of regulatory failure and led to discussions about large
scale bailout packages. As a consequence, the perception of rich people’s economic suc-
cess as institutionally deserved has suffered as well. Multilevel models combining micro
data from the 2009 round of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) with
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several macro indicators support these claims. The analysis shows that demand for tax
progressivity is higher in countries that have experienced a more severe asymmetric shock.
Importantly, this effect stems from a strengthened impact of fairness considerations on
tax policy preferences. Moreover, I use data from the 1999 ISSP round to check my
model’s exogeneity assumptions. Additional robustness checks as well as placebo tests
and an analysis of over time variation in tax policy preferences provide further support
for my argument.
The contribution of this article to the literature is threefold. First, the article shows
that fairness arguments are still important for progressive taxation. Due to the crisis, per-
ceptions of economic success as ‘deserved’ have suffered and the impact of fairness beliefs
on tax policy preferences has intensified. As a consequence, demand for tax progressivity
is higher in crisis countries. Although mass warfare has – fortunately – disappeared in
the last decades (Onorato, Scheve, & Stasavage 2014), fairness-induced appetite for pro-
gressive taxation is not dead. Other macro level shocks can strengthen demand for tax
progressivity as well. Second, the article systematically differentiates between distinct
fairness dimensions and their impact on tax policy preferences. It demonstrates how
the Great Recession as a macro-phenomenon triggered specific fairness dimensions whilst
others remained unaffected. Thus, instead of regarding fairness dimensions en bloc, using
a more fine-grained typology can help disentangle the connection between fairness per-
ceptions and demands for public policy. Finally, the article also contributes to a growing
body of literature that deals with the impact of financial and economic crises on national
tax policies (Hakelberg 2016; Lierse & Seelkopf 2016; Swank 2016a). Whilst these studies
have focussed on tax policy changes on the macro level, this article adds the micro level
to the discussion. By investigating how and why tax policy preferences differ between
countries, it marks a first step towards better integration of the demand and supply side
of tax policies in times of crisis.
The article is structured as follows. It starts by offering a short overview of the
role of economic self-interest and fairness perceptions for redistributive policies. Then, it
develops the theoretical argument about the impact of fairness arguments on tax policy
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preferences during the Great Recession. After describing the data sources and the dif-
ferent model specifications of the analysis, the results are presented. The final section
concludes by discussing the effects of crisis-induced demand for progressive taxation on
the political supply side.
2 Theory
2.1 Economic Self-Interest and Fairness Perceptions
The micro foundations of redistribution have been gaining increasing attention in recent
years. Most studies dealing with personal attitudes towards redistributive policies look
at the determinants of preferences for general redistribution and for social policy pro-
grammes. In comparison, attempts to explain preferences for tax policies have been rare.
We can differentiate between two major explanatory factors for tax policy preferences:
economic self-interest and fairness perceptions.
Traditionally, analyses of the impact of economic-self-interest on redistributive pref-
erences have dominated the literature. Much work has focused on the impact of income
status and socio-economic risk exposure on preferences for redistribution (Meltzer &
Richard 1981; Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Rehm 2009). Studies looking at the impact of
income on tax policy preferences are based on the premise that people want to maximise
their individual net income. Whilst findings clearly show that higher income leads to a
lower demand for tax progressivity (Ballard-Rosa et al. 2017; Barnes 2015), the predic-
tive power of income for redistributive preferences varies remarkably between countries
(Beramendi & Rehm 2016; Berens & Gelepithis 2018; Dion & Birchfield 2010). Authors
looking at the influence of (social) risks on individual preferences argue that higher risk
exposure increases demand for social insurance (Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Rehm 2009).
For example, Rehm (2011) claims that support for social policy programmes is particu-
larly high if the common risk pool is homogeneous.1 Progressive taxation can serve the
same function of social insurance, as it mitigates the negative effect of social risks on
real income by reducing income differences (Varian 1980). Barnes (2015) differentiates
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between preferences for the size of taxation (tax level) and the structure of taxation (tax
progressivity). She finds that risk exposure leads to higher demand for tax progressivity,
whilst it does not have an effect on preferences for tax levels. Although they are quite
distinctive in their theoretical expectations, both income- and risk-based explanations
share the same baseline assumption; individuals want to optimise their economic out-
come. They do so by either maximising their current economic situation (income-based
explanations) or by finding an optimal insurance coverage (risk-based explanations).2
The general argument of studies that look at the role of fairness perceptions for
redistributive preferences is straightforward: if economic outcomes are perceived as un-
fair, demand for a correction of these outcomes will increase (Alesina & Angeletos 2005).
Hence, even the richest members of society might demand more tax progressivity if they
perceive the tax system as unfair. Several studies have found strong correlations between
individuals’ preferences for fairness and tax progressivity (Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez, &
Rider 2007; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2017; Lü & Scheve 2016). Importantly, fairness beliefs are
closely linked to the process that has led to the status quo (Hennighausen & Heinemann
2015): if the previous allocation process is perceived as fair, the socio-economic outcome
will be perceived as fair, too. Thus, demand for redistributive taxation will be low (Fong
2001; Rowlingson & Connor 2011). We can differentiate between three dimensions of
fairness perceptions.
First, people are more likely to regard economic success as deserved (and fair) if
they perceive success as independent from socio-economic family background. Hence, if
intergenerational mobility is high, demand for market corrective, redistributive measures
will be lower (Alesina, Stantcheva, & Teso 2018; Fong 2001). However, if people believe
that wealth and income levels are predetermined by socio-economic origins, the percep-
tion of deservingness will suffer. In this case, the procedural dimension – the lottery of
birth – is completely based on luck. Therefore, its outcome is perceived as unfair. Un-
surprisingly, fairness issues related to family background are highly salient in discourses
over the inheritance tax (Beckert 2008).
Second, the role of individual effort and merit are important for fairness perceptions.
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If people attribute economic success to effort and work performance, they will perceive
income differences as deserved (Durante et al. 2014; Rowlingson & Connor 2011). Con-
trary to the family background, the individual has an active position in the procedural
dimension. Whilst family background is exogenous to an individual’s decision, work effort
and performance are not. Therefore, this deservingness dimension focuses on behavioural
aspects. By strategic risk-taking, an individual can even incorporate luck into the work
process. If economic success is the result of risk-taking, people could still view inequality
as deserved. However, this will only be the case if the risks that have been taken can
actually materialise. If there is no chance of risk-materialisation, as in the case of moral
hazard, the perception of success as a reward for bold risk-taking suffers.
Third, institutional circumstances matter for the perception of deservingness. If the
political and economic system of a country is perceived as structurally unfair, inequality
will also be regarded as unfair (Hennighausen & Heinemann 2015). In particular, the
role of the state is of central importance. When a subgroup of the population is treated
beneficially by public authorities, fairness principles are violated. In order to restore
the ‘principle of equal treatment’, demands for policies which compensate for previously
granted beneficial advantages become stronger (Scheve & Stasavage 2010, 2012, 2016).
One shortcoming of most studies on fairness perceptions is that they do not offer
an explanation for why tax policy preferences vary cross-nationally and over time. If
fairness perceptions matter for tax policy preferences, why is their impact stronger in
some countries than in others? And why do preferences change? The contribution by
Scheve and Stasavage (2016) is an important exception. The two authors show that
mass warfare intensifies the impact of the institutional deservingness dimension. They
argue that when a country faces mass warfare, richer people are treated beneficially by
the state: they are less likely to face conscription and might profit economically from a
higher demand for war-related goods. As a consequence, fairness-based demand for tax
progressivity increases. Thus, in short, mass mobilisation for warfare causes ‘compen-
satory arguments’ to tax the rich (Scheve & Stasavage 2010, 2012).
Although the work by Scheve and Stasavage helps fill a major gap in the litera-
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ture on fairness beliefs, two important questions remain unanswered. First, their main
independent variable – mass warfare – has disappeared. Modern wars are different to tra-
ditional wars: they are mainly extra-state or intrastate wars which are fought by smaller
armies because of modern war technology (Onorato et al. 2014; Sarkees & Wayman 2010).
According to Scheve and Stasavage (2016), the absence of mass warfare in the last decades
can explain the demise of progressive taxation. However, we do not know whether this
means that fairness arguments have become irrelevant for tax progressivity. The finan-
cial crisis of 2008 is a prime example of a massive asymmetric shock other than warfare
which might have triggered fairness-based demands for progressive taxation. After all,
both warfare and economic crises can cause fundamental structural and political changes
(Widmaier, Blyth, & Seabrooke 2007). Second, the perception of institutional deserving-
ness might not be the only fairness dimension that is affected by asymmetric shocks. Yet,
a systematic analysis that differentiates between fairness dimensions after such shocks is
missing. The financial crisis provides the opportunity to look at the interplay between
shocks on the macro level and different fairness dimensions.
To sum up, the literature that deals with preferences for redistribution has faced
a recent ‘fairness turn’. For times of mass warfare, our understanding of why the power
of fairness perceptions for tax policy preferences varies between countries has improved
greatly. However, we still know little about the role of fairness arguments in the absence
of mass warfare. In particular, the impact of asymmetric economic shocks might lead to
an intensified impact of some fairness dimensions on tax policy preferences whilst other
dimensions remain unaffected. As I argue in the next section, two characteristics of the
financial crisis have increased the impact of fairness beliefs on preferences for tax pro-
gressivity: the role of financial and economic elites in the run up to the financial crisis
and the role of the state before and during the crisis. In countries that were hit harder
by the crisis, these two factors gained particular public attention.
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2.2 Fairness Arguments and the Great Recession
The Crisis, the Rich, and the State
My main argument is that the Great Recession has increased demand for tax progres-
sivity. In other words, the Great Recession as a cross-nationally varying factor on the
macro level has increased micro level preferences for tax progressivity. Furthermore, I
claim that this effect originated in an intensified impact of fairness considerations on tax
policy preferences. Fairness arguments have prominently re-entered public discussions
following the economic downturn in the wake of the financial crisis. The prime example
of this is the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protest movement, which has mainly targeted
socio-economic inequality and particularly the role of the richest members of US soci-
ety. Even the main slogan of the OWS movement, "We are the 99%", straightforwardly
refers to growing inequality induced by the wealth and income development”. According
to Bartels (2013), repealing the 2001/2003 Bush tax cuts was "the most concrete policy
issue addressed (insofar as any concrete policy issue was addressed) by the Occupy Wall
Street movement" (Bartels 2013, p. 63).3 Directly referring to the OWS slogan, Paul
Krugman in his New York Times column went even further and focused on the richest
0.1% of society: "So should the 99.9 percent hate the 0.1 percent? No, not at all. But
they should ignore all the propaganda about “job creators” and demand that the super-
elite pay substantially more in taxes" (Krugman 2011).
But how might the financial crisis have sparked demands for fiscal fairness? The
crisis has led to an increased public salience of two factors. First, the financial crisis
has sparked a public debate about its causes – prominently blaming risky financial in-
vestments. The majority of opinions in the public debate has blamed the financial and
economic elites, particularly bankers, for the emergence of the Great Recession (Bartels
& Bermeo 2014; Hellwig & Coffey 2011). The image of ‘greedy’ bankers shamelessly
pursuing risky financial activities to maximise personal wealth has dominated public per-
ception. Financial market activities have been characterised as "a gambling casino" (Sinn
2010, p. 70) allowing for "skyrocketing financial speculation" (Foster & Magdoff 2009, p.
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80). This criticism has cut across political affiliations (Münnich 2016). Although finan-
cial speculation contributed to growing inequality prior to the Great Recession (Volscho
& Kelly 2012), it was only in the wake of the crisis that financial risk-taking gained pub-
lic salience (Fourcade, Steiner, Streeck, & Woll 2013). Thus, the discussion about the
causes of the crisis has put a spotlight on practices of financial investment and the role
of economic elites.
Second, the financial crisis has increased attention on the role of the state before
and during the crisis (Comiskey & Madhogarhia 2009; Hellwig & Coffey 2011). Discus-
sions about the role of the state before the crisis focus on regulatory failure. The general
argument is that ineffective financial regulation enabled financial market actors to take
up systemic risk. The huge economic downturn in 2009 (Figure 1) revealed the external
effects that came along with risky financial business models. These economic effects did
not solely hit those who previously benefited from financial markets practices, but hurt
society as a whole. In particular, lower income groups that did not participate in risky
financial investments beforehand – simply because they lacked the capital to do so – have
suffered from the crisis economically. In the U.S., relative losses in wealth "were dispro-
portionally concentrated among lower-income, less educated, and minority households"
(Pfeffer, Danziger, & Schoeni 2013, p. 98). To sum this point up, the crisis has put a
spotlight on pre-crisis regulatory failure which enabled financial actors to take up huge
external risks.4 Furthermore, public attention on the role of the state during the crisis has
concentrated on bank bailout packages. These packages were not only expensive (Rein-
hart & Rogoff 2013), but they have also been perceived by many as measures to bail out
a richer subgroup of the population (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Thus, rescuing struggling
financial institutions with public money has become a publicly salient and highly criti-
cised topic (Hellwig & Coffey 2011). I argue that both factors – the role of economic elites
and the role of the state – have affected fairness-based demand for progressive taxation.
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Fairness Dimensions and the Financial Crisis
To disentangle how the crisis-induced perception of economic elites and the state might
have influenced attitudes towards taxation, let us refer back to the three different fairness
dimensions. The impact of the lottery of birth on later economic success is a rather stable
factor, independent of economic downturns. Neither the role of the rich in the run up
to the crisis nor the role of the state stands in a direct connection to the perception of
advantages based on family background. Therefore, we have little reason to assume that
the crisis has had an impact on this fairness dimension.
Perceptions of economic success as a reward for hard work and merit were affected
both by the perception of economic elites and of the state’s activities. First, discussions
about the crisis’ causes put a focus on risk-taking on financial markets. When finan-
cial risk-taking becomes an important public issue, doubts that inequality simply results
from economic elites’ higher work effort will increase. As a consequence, the perception
of economic success as a "fruit of one’s labour" suffers and people view inequality as more
unfair (Alesina & Angeletos 2005). In other words, wealth is increasingly perceived as
exogenously rather than endogenously determined (Fong 2001). Second, in principle,
wealth that emerges from financial risk-taking might also be perceived as deserved. This
would be the case if people view the courage to take high personal risks as an effort – and
therefore as endogenously determined. If risks are entirely internalised, there would be
no need for compensation. However, the crisis has shown that these risks were not com-
pletely internalised. Instead, many high risk-takers were bailed out with public money.
If risks cannot materialise, risk-taking becomes a less bold endeavour. Hence, rewards
resulting from moral hazard are seen as undeserved. In sum, there is good reason to
assume that the impact of this behavioural fairness dimension on tax policy preferences
has intensified in crisis countries.
Second, states’ policies before the crisis and states’ reactions to the financial crisis
are related to aspects of institutional fairness. Regulatory failure in the run up to the
crisis enabled financial market actors to take up risks at the expense of society as a whole.
Thus, a lack of financial market regulation by the state indirectly favoured rich financial
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investors. Furthermore, bank bailouts also affected the institutional fairness dimension.
When struggling financial institutions were rescued with public money, people may have
perceived these bailouts as a beneficial treatment of a specific subgroup of the popula-
tion. Bailing out risk-takers might therefore create compensatory demands (Scheve &
Stasavage 2016). Hence, the role of the state before and during the crisis directly touches
upon the institutional fairness dimension. The more severe the economic crisis, the more
salient are discussions about the crisis’ causes and states’ reactions to it. As a conse-
quence, the impact of the institutional fairness dimension on tax policy preferences will
increase in crisis countries.
Based on these considerations, I expect that the financial crisis has caused a general
shift in tax policy preferences. Issues of financial risk-taking by economic elites and the
role of the state before and during the crisis have affected perceptions of behavioural
and institutional fairness. Therefore, I expect that preferences for tax progressivity are
stronger in countries that were hit harder by the crisis. Especially in those countries
that faced the biggest asymmetric economic shocks, demand for taxing the rich should
be higher. Thus, my first working hypothesis is as follows.
H1: People have a higher demand for progressive taxation in countries that have
faced a more severe economic downturn after the financial crisis of 2008.
Yet, H1 could also follow out of pure economic self-interest in times of crisis. Most
notably, a stronger economic downturn might just raise demand for insurance via taxation
as it increases the risk of becoming unemployed. In addition, experiencing crisis-induced
personal economic shocks might influence preferences for redistribution (Margalit 2013).
I do not rule out that economic development has an influence on preferences for tax pro-
gressivity by changing individual socio-economic circumstances. However, my argument
builds upon the influence of fairness considerations on tax policy preferences in the wake
of the crisis. Therefore, we would expect that H1 stems from an intensified impact of
behavioural and institutional fairness perceptions on tax policy preferences in crisis coun-
tries.
H2: The influence of behavioural and institutional fairness perceptions on tax pol-
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icy preferences is stronger in countries that have faced a more severe economic downturn
after the financial crisis of 2008.
3 Data and Models
To test my hypotheses about the impact of the Great Recession on tax policy preferences
empirically, I combine micro data from the 2009 ISSP Social Inequality IV round with
several macro level indicators and analyse it by using multilevel modelling. In total, my
sample consists of 32 countries on the macro level and 31,331 respondents on the micro
level.5 My main dependent variable is the question: "Do you think people with high in-
comes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the
same share, or a smaller share?" Respondents could answer on a five point scale covering
"much smaller share", "smaller", "the same share", "larger" and "much larger share". I re-
code the variable so that it ranges from 1="much smaller share" to 5="much larger share".
In comparison to other studies on preferences for tax progressivity, this measurement has
the advantage that it does not ask people for their opinion in relation to the current tax
system (thus, whether they think taxes on the rich are too high/low). Instead, it directly
asks for general attitudes towards progressive taxation. I treat the values of the variable
as metric.6
To capture the different dimensions of deservingness, I include three items from
the ISSP as independent variables. To cover the impact of deservingness based on family
background, I use the question: "Getting ahead: How important is coming from a wealthy
family?" Answers can range from 1="Not important at all" to 5="Essential". Thus, the
higher the variable’s values, the stronger is the perception that family background deter-
mines socio-economic success. I expect preferences for tax progressivity to be higher when
the status quo is perceived as more unfair. Behavioural deservingness is measured by the
question: "How well he or she does the job - how important should that be in deciding
pay?", where answers can again range from 1="Not important at all" to 5="Essential".
Here, higher values indicate stronger preferences for a congruence between performance
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and payment. I therefore expect demand for tax progressivity to be stronger as well.
Finally, to measure the impact of the institutional deservingness dimension on tax policy
preferences, I include the statement: "To get all the way to the top in <Respondent’s
country> today, you have to be corrupt.", to which people could agree from 1="Strongly
disagree" to 5="Strongly agree". Admittedly, this operationalisation is far from perfect
as it focuses on corruption. However, since it directly captures the perception of an im-
portant part of structural (un)deservingness in the economic and political system, it still
constitutes a valid indicator for the institutional dimension. Higher values mean that
the institutional set-up is perceived as more unfair. Consequently, I expect preferences
for tax progressivity to increase with higher values. In sum, all three dimensions are
measured on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ and I expect all coefficients to be positive.
[Figure 1 about here.]
My main economic variable on the macro level, the degree to which a country has
been hit by a crisis economically, is measured by real GDP growth rates in the year 2009.
Data come from the World Bank’s National Account Database (2017). GDP growth
in the year 2009 is particularly suited to measuring the extent to which the economic
crisis hit a country because the economic effects of the Great Recession were the most
pronounced in this year. Therefore, the differences between those countries which were
hit by the crisis vis-à-vis those which were relatively unaffected by it became clearest.
Furthermore, economic growth rates on the country level are a very visible indicator for
a general nationwide economic downturn. Figure 1 shows the average real GDP growth
rate for the 32 countries in my sample. Although GDP growth already dropped from
5.1% in 2007 to 1.4% in 2008, the year 2009 marks the low point as GDP shrunk by 4.3%
on average. In line with H1, I expect people to have higher preferences for tax progres-
sivity in countries with a lower GDP growth in 2009. I only include those countries in
the analysis in which the fieldwork exclusively took place in 2009/2010.7
Additional to these main variables of interest, I include a battery of covariates into
my models. On the micro level, I control for several variables that are likely to influence
individual attitudes towards tax progressivity. Since people with a higher income might
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demand less tax progressivity simply because they want to pay less taxes, I include a
measurement of household income into my analysis (Kenworthy & Pontusson 2005). As
income is not directly comparable in the ISSP, I follow common practice by looking at
the relative position of income earners in a country (Alt & Iversen 2017; Barnes 2015).
This is done by assigning observations to the country-specific income deciles. I expect
people with higher income to be less supportive of progressive taxation.
Rehm (2009, 2011) has made use of occupation-specific unemployment rates as a
measure of economic risk. Unfortunately, occupation-specific unemployment rates are
only available for a limited number of countries (~20). This is unproblematic for Rehm’s
studies as he mainly focuses on micro variables whilst controlling for multilevel structures
via fixed effects. Yet, I cannot apply fixed effects models since I am primarily interested in
the influence of macro variables on attitudes towards progressive taxation (Allison 2009;
Möhring 2012). Thus, I use multilevel models with random effects. In these models, such
a relatively low number of countries becomes problematic because type I errors are more
likely (Stegmueller 2013). Therefore, occupational unemployment rates are less suitable
for my analysis. In order to still control for individual risk, I use a dummy that takes the
value ‘1’ if a person is in part-time or even less than part-time employment (Rueda 2005;
Stegmueller, Scheepers, Roßteutscher, & de Jong 2012). Additionally, I include dummies
that control for unemployment, being in education (student/school/vocational training),
and retirement. Finally, a dummy for people who are not in the labour force equals ‘1’
for those who help family members, housemen/housewives, permanently disabled, and
for those who are not available on the labour market because of other reasons. For all of
these dummies, the reference category is full-time employment.
To control for the effect of education on preferences towards redistribution, I in-
clude a variable that measures the highest educational degree ranging from 0="no formal
education" to 5="university degree completed" and treat it as continuous (Barnes 2015;
Beramendi & Rehm 2016; Häusermann, Kurer, & Schwander 2016). Furthermore, I add a
control variable for religiosity that measures the attendance of religious services, ranging
from 1="never" to 8="several times a week". Following studies that stress the impor-
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tance of religiosity on redistributive preference (Scheve & Stasavage 2006; Stegmueller
et al. 2012), I expect more religious people to have a lower demand for tax progressivity.
Finally, I control for age and gender (0=female; 1=male). In line with previous research
on redistributive preferences (Gingrich & Ansell 2012; Schmidt-Catran 2016), I expect
older people to be more supportive of progressive taxation, whereas I expect men to be
less in favour of tax progressivity.
On the macro level, I include several covariates. Since countries might already differ
in economic growth prior to the crisis, I control for economic growth in 2007. To account
for different levels of risks that have been taken by financial institutions in the run up
to the crisis, I include a country’s average z-score from the years 2003–2008 in my analy-
sis (Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine 2012). The firm-level z-score measures the
financial stability of each institution. Higher values indicate a more stable financial sys-
tem. It is calculated by dividing the sum of equity capital return as a percentage of assets
by the standard deviation of returns. Then, the country-level averages of the firm-level
z-scores are taken.8 To take the influence of different levels of economic development into
account, I control for the overall level of real GDP per capita (ln value) for the year 2009.
Data come from the World Bank (2017). In addition, I check my results for robustness by
including several other macro variables (see Table OA4 in the Online Appendix). First,
different levels of inequality might influence tax policy preferences. Including inequality
becomes particularly important because my income variable does not capture absolute
differences in household income. Thus, I control for the market Gini coefficient (pre-tax
and pre-transfer) and the net Gini coefficient (post-tax and post-transfer) as measure-
ments of inequality (Solt 2016). Second, tax progressivity might be more popular in
countries that have a longer history of redistributive taxation. Therefore I include the
introduction year of the personal income tax (PIT) from the Tax Introduction Database
(Seelkopf & Genschel 2018). Third, since a more regressive tax system might have boosted
compensatory arguments as well (Scheve & Stasavage 2016), I control for the share of
total consumption tax revenues (% of GDP, year 2009) as a proxy for overall regressivity
(Prasad & Deng 2009). Data come from Prichard (2016). Finally, I control for welfare
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state effort by including social benefit expenditure as % of GDP for the year 2009 (IMF
2017).9
I run several multilevel specifications with random intercepts to identify the deter-
minants of preferences for tax progressivity. Since income as a predictor of preferences
for redistribution may vary strongly between countries (Beramendi & Rehm 2016), all
models include random slopes for household income. First, I calculate a minimum exam-
ple that only includes real GDP growth rates. By doing so, I ensure that the effects of
my main independent variable are not driven by my choice of covariates (Lenz & Sahn
2017). Subsequently, I add the micro and macro variables.10 All individual level variables
are unstandardised and unweighted.11
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel analyses. In the minimum example (Model
1), GDP growth in 2009 has a negative and statistically significant impact on preferences
for tax progressivity. Thus, respondents in countries with a lower GDP growth in 2009
have a higher demand for tax progressivity.12 This finding is in line with H1 and holds
when adding control variables on the micro level (Model 2), taking average GDP growth
in the first half of 2009 for those countries where the fieldwork took place earlier (Model
3), and adding further controls on the macro level (Model 4). A change in growth by two
standard deviation leads to a change in tax progressivity by 1/4 of its standard deviation.
As a comparison, this effect is nearly the same size as the effect of a change from the
lowest to the highest household income group. This result is highly significant and robust
to adding further control variables (Table OA4) and using multilevel generalized linear
models (Table OA6).
[Table 1 about here.]
Regarding the other control variables on the macro level, neither the coefficients of
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previous GDP growth in 2007, nor the ones of ln GDP per capita 2009 nor the z-score
are statistically significant.
Let us now look at the micro variables.13 All three dimensions of deservingness have
positive and highly significant coefficients. Thus, demand for tax progressivity is higher
if socio-economic outcomes are perceived as unfair. Since all three variables are scaled
identically, we can compare their coefficients directly. The coefficients differ remarkably.
The institutional dimension of deservingness has the largest effect of the three dimen-
sions, followed by the behavioural and the family background dimension. The coefficient
of the institutional dimension is nearly twice as large as that of the family background
dimension. This finding indicates that the strength of different fairness dimensions varies
substantially. In particular, if the political and economic system of a country is per-
ceived as unfair, demand for correcting the economic outcomes via progressive taxation
increases.
In line with other empirical studies, my results show that people with a higher in-
come are less supportive of tax progressivity (Barnes 2015; Hennighausen & Heinemann
2015). The coefficient for economic risk – measured via part-time employment – is not
statistically significant. This is in contrast to studies which look at the impact of risk
on preferences for social policy. Although this might result from the operationalisation
of economic risk (Rehm 2011), it hints at differences between social policy and taxation;
in contrast to social policy, progressive taxation does not directly insure people against
social risks. Therefore, the demand for social insurance via redistributive taxation (Var-
ian 1980) might be weaker than the demand for insurance via welfare state programmes.
As expected, more religious people have a lower demand for tax progressivity (Scheve &
Stasavage 2006). The same applies to people with a higher level of education. Interest-
ingly, whereas older people have a higher demand for progressive taxation, retired persons
actually want less tax progressivity. Cohort effects regarding experiences of mass warfare
might be one factor that could explain why older people tend to be more supportive of
tax progressivity (Obinger 2012; Scheve & Stasavage 2012), whereas the negative effect
of retirement remains puzzling. Apart from the umbrella category of not being in the
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labour force, all other micro variables (unemployment and gender) are not statistically
significant. Moreover, I have added dummies which measure political affiliation to the
models (Table OA7).14 People with affiliations to leftist or centrist parties demand more
tax progressivity than rightist voters. All other coefficients stay similar. As a comparison,
a change in growth by one standard deviation has the same effect on preferences for tax
progressivity than being a centrist instead of a rightist voter.
4.2 Exogeneity of the Crisis
The depth of the 2009 recession may not be entirely exogenous. In the following, I
describe the factors that challenge the exogeneity assumption. Furthermore, I provide
evidence that the effect of the financial crisis on tax policy preferences remains stable
across model specifications which take exogeneity concerns into account.
First, domestic institutions and policies might mitigate the economic shock. In par-
ticular, automatic stabilisers such as social security programmes can lead to less severe
economic downturns. In other words, economic shocks might be weaker in countries with
bigger governments and more generous social policy programmes. To control for possible
stabilisation effects, I include total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP into
my model (Table 2, first column). Data come from the IMF (2017). The crisis effect
remains robust.
Second, the depth of the recession in 2009 could be influenced by previous economic
development. Countries with a strong growth trajectory might have experienced a weaker
downturn than countries that already had poor economic prospects prior to the crisis.
To rule out that the crisis measure is determined by previous economic trajectories, I
rerun my models by using the cumulative output gap instead of real GDP growth rates.
To calculate the output gap, I estimate GDP per capita (pc) in 2009 with a Kalman
smoothing procedure based on GDP pc time series from 2000-2008. The output gap is
the difference between real and estimated values of GDP pc in 2009 as a percentage of
GDP pc in 2008. Furthermore, I check the results by taking the output gap for 2010 if
the ISSP’s fieldwork took place later. Columns 2 & 3 in Table 2 present the results. The
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findings are in line with H1 : countries with a bigger output gap have a higher demand
for tax progressivity.
Third, one might argue that countries with generally stronger preferences for pro-
gressive taxation have faced a stronger economic downturn. To rule out this possibility,
I make use of the 1999 ISSP round and run a placebo test with the 1999 ISSP data and
GDP growth rates from 2009 (Table 2, column 4). The results reveal that the economic
downturn of 2009 was not stronger in countries where people already demanded more
progressive taxation prior to the crisis. This finding supports my model’s exogeneity
assumption. In addition, I compare the impact of GDP growth rates in 1999 on tax
policy preferences to the results in 2009 for those countries that were surveyed in both
rounds (Table 2, columns 5 & 6). In the wake of the crisis, the impact of GDP growth
on preferences for tax progressivity is robust to using this reduced sample. In 1999,
however, we cannot find an impact of GDP growth. Hence, economic development does
not have an impact on tax policy preferences per se. Instead, the procedural dimension
that is connected to the economic downturn – the financial crisis – is crucial in order to
understand the effect in 2009.
[Table 2 about here.]
Thus far, I have shown that crisis countries have had a higher demand for tax
progressivity. However, I have not looked at changes in tax policy preferences. Due to
the lack of yearly data, I focus on long term development of tax policy preferences by
looking at the changes from 1999 to 2009. I calculate each country’s weighted mean in
tax progressivity preferences in both years and take the first difference. In total, this
leaves me with 19 observations.15 First, I run bivariate models to see whether the crisis
in 2009 can explain differences in changes. Then, I expand this model by adding control
variables. I include changes in age as a covariate since ageing societies might demand
more tax progressivity. Furthermore, changing patterns of economic risk might have
an effect on tax progressivity. Therefore, I include changes in unemployment and part-
time work. Finally, I control for changes in religiosity to capture secularisation trends.
The regression analyses (Table 3, Models 1-5) support my previous findings: Across all
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models, real GDP growth in 2009 has a negative and statistically significant influence on
the change in preferences for tax progressivity. Thus, a strong economic downturn has
increased preferences for progressive taxation. Additionally, I rerun the same model but
replace GDP growth with a dummy variable that turns ‘1’ when a country faced a strong
economic downturn of more than 2% of GDP.16 The results show that a strong economic
downturn in the wake of the crisis has had a positive influence on support for progressive
taxation (Table 3, Model 6). The effect of a major economic crisis on demand for tax
progressivity is 0.2 points – again, as a comparison, this equals the effect of switching
from the highest to the lowest income decile.
[Table 3 about here.]
4.3 The Impact of Fairness Perceptions in Times of Crisis
To find out whether the impact of the fairness dimensions on tax policy preferences is
stronger in countries that faced a more severe economic downturn (H2 ), I use a cross-
level interaction term between the 2009 growth rates and each of the three deservingness
dimensions (Table OA5). Looking only at the interaction terms, we see that the inter-
actions between growth and the behavioural deservingness dimension as well as between
growth and the institutional deservingness dimension are negative and statistically signif-
icant. To interpret the cross-level interaction terms substantially, I calculate the marginal
effects of each fairness dimension conditional on GDP growth in 2009 (Brambor, Clark, &
Golder 2006). Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2017) have shown that interaction effects
are often interpreted in areas without common support in the data. I follow their sug-
gestion and add histograms which show the distribution of GDP growth to the marginal
effects plots. Figure 2 presents the results.17 As expected, the coefficient for the family
background dimension does not vary considerably; the impact is very similar between
countries which faced a strong recession in 2009 and those which did not. For the other
two dimensions, however, the coefficients differ strongly. The marginal effect for the be-
havioural deservingness dimension is more than twice as large in countries with a major
economic downturn of 5% in 2009 compared to those with a positive growth rate of 1%.
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For the institutional deservingness dimension, the marginal effect increases slightly less,
but still substantially by 50%. Thus, the impact of fairness considerations on tax policy
preferences has intensified in countries that were hit harder by the crisis. These results
are largely in line with H2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
5 Conclusion
Can fairness arguments play a role for progressive taxation in the absence of mass warfare?
By looking at the impact of the Great Recession on tax policy preferences, I have shown
that different fairness dimensions are still important for shaping public preferences to-
wards tax progressivity. The perception of rich people’s economic success as individually
deserved and institutionally fair suffered as the crisis raised the salience of risky financial
investments and fuelled public discussions about regulatory failure and bank bailouts.
As a consequence, the impact of the behavioural and institutional fairness dimension
on tax policy preferences intensified in countries with a strong economic downturn and
demand for progressive taxation increased. The mechanisms during the Great Recession
are somewhat similar to those during wartime (Scheve & Stasavage 2016): when society
is doing badly and rich people are perceived as the ones to blame and/or profiteers of
state actions, notions of undeservingness are triggered. Hence, people think it is only fair
that the rich do worse as well. As a result, aggregate demand for a compression of in-
come and wealth via progressive taxation increases. My analysis also considers that other
factors can have an effect on attitudes towards progressive taxation. In fact, dominant
theories about the influence of micro level characteristics such as income and religion are
supported by my results. Yet, these factors cannot fully explain why attitudes towards
progressive taxation vary between countries in the wake of the crisis. Crisis-induced fair-
ness arguments help understand this variation.
Placing my study in the discussion about progressive taxation in the last 30 years,
I have shown that public opinion in the wake of the crisis pushes against the general time
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trend in tax policy-making. Whilst the taxation of top incomes has decreased massively
since the late 1970s (Ganghof 2006; Kiser & Karceski 2017; Swank 2016b), the crisis
has raised political demand for progressive taxation again. By analysing preferences for
progressive taxation in the wake of the crisis, this study has looked at the demand side –
the very first stage of public policy-making. Yet, I have not examined actual tax policy
outputs. Looking at the development of top statutory PIT rates reveals that the crisis
was a game-changer indeed (Figure 3). Whilst tax rates for top incomes have decreased
from 2000 to 2008, this development has reversed since the financial crisis. Thus, the
data suggest that demand for progressive taxation was supplied politically. Moreover,
the trend of increasing top PIT rates since the crisis has persisted. This indicates that
a substantial change in tax policy-making has taken place. However, more work has
to be done in order to identify the causal effect of the financial crisis on tax policies.
Furthermore, we know relatively little about the responsiveness of governments towards
tax policy demands. Finding out when and how politicians react to voters’ tax policy
preferences is therefore a promising avenue for further research.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Finally, it is noteworthy that the ISSP question about tax progressivity does not
exclusively refer to highly progressive tax measures for the richest members of society.
Instead, it captures a broader feeling about the idea of redistributive income taxation.
While taxing income still marks the focal point of the redistributive tax state, it would
be interesting to investigate whether the crisis has affected attitudes towards other taxes.
For example, the idea of redistributing wealth via the taxation of inheritances has recently
re-entered the public and scholarly debate (Atkinson 2015; Piketty 2014). Other highly
progressive taxes such as recurrent taxes on wealth, land taxes, and capital gains taxes
have also gained momentum (The Economist 2018). Finding out which role fairness per-
ceptions have played for this development is crucial for our understanding of progressive
taxation in the 21st century.
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Notes
1For an extension of this model covering labour market segmentation, see Alt and Iversen (2017).
2Also, some studies combine income-based with risk-based explanations and demonstrate that both
approaches are not mutually exclusive (Carnes & Mares 2015; Moene & Wallerstein 2003; Rehm, Hacker,
& Schlesinger 2012).
3For an overview of the discussion about the Bush tax cuts, see Bartels (2005), Hacker and Pierson
(2005), Lupia, Levine, Menning, and Sin (2007), and Bartels (2007).
4Authors like Morgenson and Rosner (2011) have claimed that "the mortage binge enriched a few and
imperiled many" and call it "a reckless endangerment of the entire [U.S.] nation by people at the highest
levels of Washington and corporate America" (Morgenson & Rosner 2011, p. 7).
5Table OA1 in the Online Appendix lists the countries and the fieldwork period of the ISSP. Taiwan is
excluded from the analysis as it lacks data for most macro level indicators. Portugal is excluded because
it lacks the question on the behavioural fairness dimension.
6See also Beramendi and Rehm (2016) as well as Gingrich and Ansell (2012). However, I additionally
check my results by running multilevel generalised linear models for an ordinal dependent variable.
7Additionally, I rerun my analysis by using the average year-to-year GDP growth of the first two
quarters of 2009 for those countries in which the fieldwork started before 07/2009.
8For a more detailed discussion about measuring financial risks and the advantages/disadvantages of
the z-score, see Laeven and Valencia (2012).
9Tables OA2 and OA3 provide an overview and summary statistics of the variables used in the
analysis.
10All models are estimated with a maximum likelihood estimation. Regression tables are produced
with the texreg package (Leifield 2013).
11For a discussion of standardisation via mean centring, see Hox (2010).
12Figure OA1 visualises this result by plotting average preferences for tax progressivity (weighted)
against GDP growth in 2009.
13The effect sizes and significance levels of the micro variables stay similar when all country-level
clustering is controlled for via a fixed effects model (OA7, Model 1) and when using country-specific
clustered standard errors (OA7, Model 2). Furthermore, I checked the models for multicollinearity.
14The number of countries decreases to 29 as information on political affiliation is missing for three
countries (Chile, Hungary, Israel).
15The question on attendance of religious service has not been asked in Bulgaria in 1999. Therefore,
Bulgaria is excluded from the analysis.
16Results are also robust to taking different thresholds (-1 and 0 percent of GDP) for strong economic
downturns.
22
17Marginal effects plots have been produced with the interplot package (Solt & Hu 2015).
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Figure 1: Average GDP Growth Rates of Countries in the Sample, 1990-2014
−2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
R
ea
l G
D
P 
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
Note: Data come from the World Bank (2017). Unweighted mean of the 32 countries in
the sample.
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Different Fairness Dimensions
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Figure 3: Top PIT Rate, 2000-2016
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Note: Average for 35 OECD Countries. Data come from the OECD (2017).
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Table 1: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0102 −0.0102 −0.0102
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Unemployed −0.0149 −0.0149 −0.0151
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179)
In Education −0.0771∗∗∗ −0.0771∗∗∗ −0.0769∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)
Retired −0.0285∗ −0.0285∗ −0.0286∗
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Not in Labour Force −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗ −0.0393∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149)
Educational Level −0.0060∗ −0.0060∗ −0.0059∗
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Age 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Male −0.0110 −0.0110 −0.0110
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Religiosity −0.0101∗∗∗ −0.0101∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Income −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Des. Backgr. 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Des. Behav. 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Des. Inst. 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 −0.0205∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0064) (0.0065)
Growth First Half 2009 −0.0220∗∗∗
(0.0064)
Growth 2007 −0.0053
(0.0123)
Z-Score −0.0065
(0.0046)
GDP 2009 (ln) −0.0251
(0.0354)
(Intercept) 3.9068∗∗∗ 3.7009∗∗∗ 3.6830∗∗∗ 4.0544∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0524) (0.0529) (0.3951)
AIC 71407.5999 70540.4758 70538.5077 70543.9832
Log Likelihood −35699.7999 −35251.2379 −35250.2538 −35249.9916
Num. obs. 31331 31331 31331 31331
Num. groups: country 32 32 32 32
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity in 2009 and 1999
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Control Exp. Output Gap I Output Gap II Placebo 1999 Reduced 1999 Reduced 2009
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0090 −0.0101 −0.0101 −0.0049 −0.0052 −0.0013
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0195)
Unemployed −0.0141 −0.0148 −0.0148 0.0033 0.0039 −0.0256
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0243)
In Education −0.0800∗∗∗ −0.0766∗∗∗ −0.0766∗∗∗ −0.0525∗ −0.0522∗ −0.1137∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0304)
Retired −0.0261∗ −0.0284∗ −0.0283∗ −0.0080 −0.0073 −0.0394∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0192)
Not in Labour Force −0.0342∗∗ −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0486∗∗ −0.0491∗∗ −0.0343∗
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0200)
Educational Level −0.0098∗∗∗ −0.0059∗ −0.0058∗ −0.0209∗∗∗ −0.0208∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044)
Age 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Male −0.0079 −0.0111 −0.0111 −0.0296∗∗ −0.0300∗∗ −0.0190
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0115)
Religiosity −0.0072∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0065 −0.0067 −0.0116∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0029)
Income −0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0259∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0040)
Des. Backgr. 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052)
Des. Behav. 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗ 0.0195∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0076)
Des. Inst. 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0049)
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 −0.0183∗∗ −0.0062 −0.0194∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0090)
Growth 1999 −0.0149
(0.0124)
Output Gap 2009 −1.4509∗∗
(0.6032)
Output Gap 2009/2010 −1.1350∗∗
(0.5709)
Growth t-2 −0.0090 −0.0120 −0.0118 −0.0166 −0.0206 −0.0019
(0.0122) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0144)
Z-Score −0.0051 −0.0051 −0.0058 −0.0143∗∗ −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0066
(0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0053)
GDP (ln) −0.0271 −0.0304 −0.0375 −0.0639∗∗ −0.0720∗∗∗ −0.0165
(0.0436) (0.0358) (0.0367) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0444)
Government Exp. −0.0031
(0.0043)
(Intercept) 4.1169∗∗∗ 4.0715∗∗∗ 4.1749∗∗∗ 4.7743∗∗∗ 4.9531∗∗∗ 3.9291∗∗∗
(0.3990) (0.4010) (0.4094) (0.2915) (0.2937) (0.4854)
AIC 70158.8442 70544.5801 70546.2602 39720.2755 39719.5869 41219.0290
Log Likelihood −35053.4221 −35250.2901 −35251.1301 −19838.1377 −19837.7935 −20584.5145
Num. obs. 31331 31331 31331 17363 17363 18374
Num. groups: country 32 32 32 19 19 19
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3: Determinants of Change in Preferences for Tax Progressivity 1999–2009
DV: ∆ Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Growth 2009 −0.0191∗∗ −0.0192∗∗ −0.0195∗∗ −0.0192∗∗ −0.0188∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0082)
Major Economic Crisis 0.2121∗∗∗
(0.0670)
∆ Age 0.0149 0.0080 0.0073 0.0068 0.0038
(0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0231)
∆ Part-Time Empl. −1.6727 −1.6912 −1.7881 −2.7635∗∗
(1.4980) (1.6177) (1.5008) (1.1062)
∆ Religosity 0.0132 0.0152 0.0963
(0.1850) (0.1840) (0.1558)
∆ Unempl. −0.1082 −0.3869
(0.8859) (0.7139)
(Intercept) −0.1862∗∗∗−0.2095∗∗∗−0.2046∗∗∗−0.2015∗∗∗−0.1978∗∗∗−0.2594∗∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0535) (0.0443) (0.0578) (0.0561) (0.0814)
R2 0.2173 0.2350 0.2806 0.2808 0.2813 0.4905
Num. obs. 19 19 19 19 19 19
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table OA1: Country Sample and Time of Fieldwork
Country Time Period of Fieldwork
Argentina 07/2010-11/2010
Australia 12/2009-02/2010
Austria 07/2010-09/2010
Belgium 03/2009-07/2009
Chile 05/2009-06/2009
Croatia 06/2009-09/2009
Denmark 09/2009-01/2010
Estonia 06/2010-07/2010
Finland 10/2009-12/2009
France 04/2009-07/2009
Germany 05/2010-11/2010
Hungary 11/2009
Iceland 11/2009-05/2010
Israel 09/2009-02/2010
Japan 11/2009
Latvia 06/2009-07/2009
New Zealand 07/2009-11/2009
Norway 10/2009-05/2010
Philippines 10/2009
Poland 06/2010-07/2010
Russia 12/2009
Slovak Republic 09/2009-10/2009
Slovenia 03/2009-06/2009
South Africa 11/2009-12/2009
South Korea 06/2009-08/2009
Spain 11/2009
Sweden 02/2009-05/2009
Switzerland 02/2009-09/2009
Turkey 10/2009-01/2010
Ukraine 06/2009
United Kingdom 06/2009-11/2009
United States 03/2010-08/2010
Venezuela 06/2010
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Table OA2: Summary Statistics of Main Micro and Macro Variables
Country Tax Prog. Des. Backgr. Des. Behav. Des. Inst. Growth 2009
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 Ukraine 4.50 0.71 3.34 1.19 4.31 0.75 3.68 1.11 -14.80
2 South Korea 4.42 0.67 3.39 1.01 4.10 0.74 3.24 1.22 0.71
3 Russia 4.38 0.80 3.09 1.19 4.18 0.77 3.47 1.19 -7.82
4 France 4.23 0.73 2.31 0.99 4.03 0.79 3.04 1.28 -2.94
5 Japan 4.22 0.70 2.55 0.92 4.11 0.74 2.26 1.33 -5.53
6 Slovenia 4.19 0.68 2.96 1.09 4.10 0.74 3.20 1.16 -7.80
7 Croatia 4.12 0.67 3.32 1.18 4.27 0.66 3.40 1.19 -7.38
8 Germany 4.11 0.72 2.92 1.05 4.14 0.61 2.55 1.33 -5.62
9 Finland 4.09 0.68 2.17 0.85 4.01 0.69 2.17 1.08 -8.27
10 Turkey 4.07 0.94 3.05 1.20 4.01 0.68 3.43 1.26 -4.83
11 Spain 4.07 0.70 2.87 1.20 3.92 0.73 2.33 1.29 -3.57
12 Latvia 4.00 0.67 3.16 1.15 4.09 0.71 2.94 1.18 -14.35
13 Hungary 4.00 0.76 3.29 1.13 4.35 0.74 3.20 1.17 -6.56
14 United Kingdom 4.00 0.71 2.35 1.00 3.94 0.73 2.29 1.12 -4.19
15 Slovak Republic 4.00 0.79 3.01 1.18 4.25 0.75 3.08 1.17 -5.49
16 Argentina 3.99 0.77 2.37 1.21 4.00 0.64 2.56 1.36 0.05
17 Austria 3.98 0.66 3.00 1.05 4.34 0.67 2.68 1.28 -3.80
18 Estonia 3.97 0.77 2.93 0.99 4.17 0.77 2.64 1.24 -14.72
19 Chile 3.92 0.86 2.92 1.23 4.03 0.66 2.26 1.17 -1.04
20 Australia 3.91 0.70 2.61 1.01 3.99 0.76 2.22 1.11 1.82
21 Sweden 3.87 0.71 2.49 0.94 4.15 0.64 1.84 1.02 -5.18
22 South Africa 3.87 0.80 3.35 1.25 4.06 0.81 2.36 1.44 -1.54
23 Iceland 3.87 0.60 2.39 0.94 4.12 0.68 2.69 1.24 -4.68
24 Poland 3.84 0.79 3.33 1.11 4.18 0.73 3.04 1.19 2.63
25 Belgium 3.84 0.75 2.60 0.86 4.09 0.69 2.67 1.09 -2.28
26 Venezuela 3.82 0.82 2.32 1.17 3.84 0.91 2.58 1.35 -3.20
27 Philippines 3.81 1.07 2.95 1.20 4.19 0.71 1.44 0.76 1.15
28 United States 3.80 0.76 2.85 1.07 4.29 0.61 2.17 1.16 -2.78
29 Norway 3.78 0.64 2.45 0.88 3.97 0.76 1.77 0.91 -1.62
30 Israel 3.78 0.78 3.09 1.04 4.09 0.76 3.09 1.15 1.27
31 Denmark 3.76 0.69 2.35 0.84 3.76 0.82 1.57 1.00 -5.09
32 New Zealand 3.65 0.70 2.25 0.93 4.18 0.67 1.72 0.86 -0.25
Online Appendix, page 2
Table OA3: Summary Statistics of Micro and Macro Variables
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Comment Data Source
Micro Variables
Tax Progressivity 31,331 4.004 0.784 1 5 – ISSP
Des. Backgr. 31,331 2.823 1.140 1 5 – ISSP
Des. Behav. 31,331 4.097 0.745 1 5 – ISSP
Des. Inst. 31,331 2.600 1.326 1 5 – ISSP
Part-Time Employed 31,331 0.098 0.298 0 1 Ref. Category: Full-Time Employed ISSP
Unemployed 31,331 0.074 0.261 0 1 Ref. Category: Full-Time Employed ISSP
In Education 31,331 0.048 0.215 0 1 Ref. Category: Full-Time Employed ISSP
Retired 31,331 0.200 0.400 0 1 Ref. Category: Full-Time Employed ISSP
Not in Labour Force 31,331 0.119 0.324 0 1 Ref. Category: Full-Time Employed ISSP
Educational Level 31,331 3.951 1.452 1 6 – ISSP
Age 31,331 33.014 16.686 1 84 – ISSP
Male 31,331 0.459 0.498 0 1 – ISSP
Religiosity 31,331 3.638 2.298 1 8 – ISSP
Income Deciles 31,331 5.311 2.829 1 10 – ISSP
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 32 −4.303 4.485 −14.800 2.634 – World Bank (2017)
Growth 2007 32 5.198 2.741 0.426 10.834 – World Bank (2017)
Z-Score 32 10.256 6.506 −0.945 27.488 Average 2004–2008 Cihak et al. (2012)
GDP 2009 (ln) 32 9.919 0.904 7.516 11.290 Per capita World Bank (2017)
Net Gini 32 32.486 7.719 24.159 59.175 Year 2009 Solt (2016)
Market Gini 32 46.599 6.216 33.226 67.570 Year 2009 Solt (2016)
Introduction PIT 32 1,922.656 42.765 1,842 1,994 – Seelkopf and Genschel (2018)
Revenue from Sales Tax 32 6.595 2.217 1.953 11.242 % of GDP, Year 2009 Prichard (2016)
Social Benefit Expenditure 29 40.138 16.760 14 73 % of GDP, Year 2009 IMF (2017)
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Table OA4: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity: Robustness Checks
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Unemployed −0.014 −0.013 −0.014 −0.014 −0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
In Education −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Retired −0.026∗ −0.026∗ −0.026∗ −0.026∗ −0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Not in Labour Force −0.034∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Educational Level −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Religiosity −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Des. Backgr. 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Des. Behav. 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Des. Inst. 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 −0.017∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Net Gini −0.002
(0.004)
Market Gini −0.006
(0.004)
Introduction PIT 0.000
(0.001)
Revenue from Sales Taxes −0.017
(0.013)
Social Benefits Expenditure 0.003
(0.002)
(Intercept) 3.673∗∗∗ 3.893∗∗∗ 2.991∗∗ 3.717∗∗∗ 3.523∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.215) (1.421) (0.095) (0.090)
AIC 70156.174 70154.704 70156.142 70154.929 62709.331
Log Likelihood −35055.087 −35054.352 −35055.071 −35054.465 −31331.666
Num. obs. 31331 31331 31331 31331 28679
Num. groups: country 32 32 32 32 29
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table OA5: Results Multilevel Models with Interaction Effects
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0102 −0.0101 −0.0100
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Unemployed −0.0152 −0.0151 −0.0156
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179)
In Education −0.0769∗∗∗ −0.0769∗∗∗ −0.0766∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)
Retired −0.0285∗ −0.0284∗ −0.0284∗
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Not in Labour Force −0.0393∗∗∗ −0.0395∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149)
Educational Level −0.0059∗ −0.0059∗ −0.0060∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Age 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Male −0.0110 −0.0109 −0.0110
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Religiosity −0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Income −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Des. Backgr. 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Des. Behav. 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0058)
Des. Inst. 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0049)
Macro Variables
Growth 2007 −0.0053 −0.0052 −0.0049
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Z-Score −0.0065 −0.0064 −0.0065
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0046)
GDP 2009 (ln) −0.0249 −0.0244 −0.0216
(0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0355)
Growth 2009 −0.0151∗∗ −0.0061 −0.0110
(0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0070)
Cross-Level Interaction Terms
Des. Backgr * Growth 2009 −0.0006
(0.0009)
Des. Behav. * Growth 2009 −0.0026∗
(0.0013)
Des. Inst. * Growth 2009 −0.0020∗∗
(0.0009)
(Intercept) 4.0592∗∗∗ 4.0882∗∗∗ 4.0418∗∗∗
(0.3956) (0.3951) (0.3959)
AIC 70545.5903 70542.2662 70540.5574
Log Likelihood −35249.7951 −35248.1331 −35247.2787
Num. obs. 31331 31331 31331
Num. groups: country 32 32 32
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table OA6: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity: Generalised Linear Models
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0243 −0.0226 −0.0227
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0387)
Unemployed −0.0274 −0.0271 −0.0306
(0.0460) (0.0460) (0.0460)
In Education −0.1825∗∗∗ −0.1815∗∗∗ −0.1822∗∗∗
(0.0547) (0.0547) (0.0547)
Retired −0.0572 −0.0552 −0.0584
(0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384)
Not in Labour Force −0.0991∗∗∗ −0.0956∗∗ −0.0986∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384)
Educational Level −0.0159∗ −0.0157∗ −0.0153∗
(0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087)
Age 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Male −0.0206 −0.0209 −0.0223
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227)
Religiosity −0.0265∗∗∗ −0.0269∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Income −0.0605∗∗∗ −0.0606∗∗∗ −0.0608∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Des. Backgr. 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Des. Behav. 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Des. Inst. 0.1105∗∗∗ 0.1104∗∗∗ 0.1099∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 −0.0530∗∗∗ −0.0462∗∗ −0.0391∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0183)
Growth First Half 2009 −0.0519∗∗∗
(0.0184)
Growth 2007 −0.0233
(0.0350)
Z-Score −0.0096
(0.0128)
GDP 2009 (ln) −0.1889∗
(0.1033)
AIC 68901.0312 67971.9362 67970.4015 67973.4204
Log Likelihood −34444.5156 −33966.9681 −33966.2008 −33964.7102
Num. obs. 31331 31331 31331 31331
Groups (country) 32 32 32 32
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table OA7: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity: Additional Party Variables
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0175 −0.0175 −0.0176
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Unemployed −0.0198 −0.0198 −0.0202
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)
In Education −0.0783∗∗∗ −0.0783∗∗∗ −0.0781∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220)
Retired −0.0185 −0.0186 −0.0186
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Not in Labour Force −0.0318∗∗ −0.0318∗∗ −0.0319∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Educational Level −0.0092∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Age 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Male −0.0093 −0.0092 −0.0092
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Religiosity −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0066∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Income −0.0216∗∗∗ −0.0216∗∗∗ −0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Des. Backgr. 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Des. Behav. 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Des. Inst. 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Left Affiliation 0.2335∗∗∗ 0.2335∗∗∗ 0.2335∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Center Affiliation 0.0791∗∗∗ 0.0791∗∗∗ 0.0788∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133)
No Affiliation 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Macro Variables
Growth 2009 −0.0169∗∗ −0.0155∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0070)
Growth First Half 2009 −0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0069)
Growth 2007 −0.0117
(0.0155)
Z-Score −0.0060
(0.0054)
GDP 2009 (ln) −0.0512
(0.0400)
(Intercept) 3.6288∗∗∗ 3.6123∗∗∗ 4.2680∗∗∗
(0.0567) (0.0574) (0.4683)
AIC 64124.2587 64122.7419 64127.8460
Log Likelihood −32040.1294 −32039.3710 −32038.9230
Num. obs. 28837 28837 28837
Num. groups: country 29 29 29
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table OA8: Results Multilevel Models for Tax Progressivity: Robustness Micro Variables
DV: Preferences for Tax Progressivity
Model 1 Model 2
Micro Variables
Part-Time Employed −0.0094 −0.0206
(0.0152) (0.0247)
Unemployed −0.0116 −0.0227
(0.0179) (0.0280)
In Education −0.0706∗∗∗ −0.0573∗
(0.0216) (0.0295)
Retired −0.0173 0.0224
(0.0151) (0.0329)
Not in Labour Force −0.0393∗∗∗ −0.0141
(0.0149) (0.0279)
Educational Level −0.0056 −0.0006
(0.0034) (0.0098)
Age 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Male −0.0116 −0.0228
(0.0089) (0.0151)
Religiosity −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0135∗
(0.0022) (0.0067)
Income −0.0215∗∗∗ −0.0190∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0031)
Des. Backgr. 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0130)
Des. Behav. 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0134)
Des. Inst. 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0783∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0113)
(Intercept) 3.7908∗∗∗ 3.6175∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.1123)
Adj. R2 0.0961 0.0430
Num. obs. 31331 31331
Num. groups: country 32 32
Model Country FE Country Clustered SE
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure OA1: GDP Growth 2009 and Aggregate Demand for Tax Progressivity
(a) Full Sample
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(b) Excluding Outliers
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